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Veteran's Administration
Not Liable for Failing to
Warn Purchasers of
Foreclosed Residence
About Asbestos
In Kane v. United States, 15 F.3d
87 (8th Cir. 1994), the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit held that
the Veteran's Administration (VA)
was not negligent in failing to warn
the purchasers of a foreclosed resi-
dence about the presence of asbestos
under the Federal Tort Claim Act
(FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Sections 2674 and
2680(a). The Eighth Circuit also de-
termined that the VA was not strictly
liable for releasing a hazardous sub-
stance under the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42
U.S.C. Sections 9601-9657. The court
found no statutory or regulatory re-
quirements mandating the VA or its
assignees to inspect for asbestos in
residences acquired through foreclo-
sure.
House Sold in "As Is" Condition
In June of 1989, Bradley and
Cynthia Kane purchased a residence
from the VA. The VA had acquired
the property at a foreclosure sale in
February 1989. The VA contracted
with a private management broker to
maintain and market the property for
sale. The property had been adver-
tised in the local newspaper as having
electrical and plumbing problems. The
notice also informed potential buyers
that the property was to be sold in "as
is" condition.
Prior to purchasing the property,
the Kanes had their lender inspect
and appraise the property. The
lender's report noted that the prop-
erty was in average condition. In
January of 1990, six months after
the Kanes purchased their home,
they discovered asbestos in the resi-
dence.
The Kanes brought suit under both
the FTCA and CERCLA to recover
damages associated with the discov-
ery of asbestos in the home they had
purchased from the VA. They claimed
the VA, as owner and operator of the
residence, was strictly liable under
CERCLA for releasing a hazardous
substance. The Kanes further asserted
that the VA was liable for the costs
they incurred as a result of having to
remove the asbestos. In addition, the
Kanes contended that the VA was neg-
ligent in failing to inform them of the
property's true condition.
The district court granted the
government's motion to dismiss both
the FTCA and CERCLA claims. In
doing so, the court noted that the
FTCA, under its discretionary func-
tion exception, allowed the VA a
policymaking prerogative to create a
list of items for which VA property
management brokers were to look.
Thus, the discretionary function ex-
ception gave the VA the option to
exclude asbestos inspections from its
list.
As to the CERCLA claim, the dis-
trict court agreed with the govern-
ment that the Kanes' house was not a
"facility" as defined by the statute.
The asbestos installed and used in the
Kanes' residence was not "disposal"
of a hazardous substance within the
meaning of CERCLA. Instead, the
asbestos was a "consumer product in
consumer use," and was therefore ex-
cluded from statutory regulation. The
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of both claims.
VA's Discretionary Decision-
Making Policies Considered an
Exception from the FTCA
On appeal, the Kanes first argued
that the district court erred in dismiss-
ing the FTCA claim because the gov-
ernment did not prove that the VA's
actions involved an element of judg-
ment grounded in social, economic,
and political policy. The Eighth Cir-
cuit disagreed, looking to the language
of the FTCA and the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of this
language.
The FTCA provides for the waiver
of sovereign immunity in tort claims
against the United States government.
The FTCA, however, also excepts
from tort claims government actions
that are discretionary in nature. This
exception includes those actions which
involve an element of judgment or
choice. 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(a).
In determining whether the VA's
actions were discretionary, the Eighth
Circuit noted that the Supreme Court
has upheld FTCA causes of action
predicated on situations where a stat-
ute, regulation, or policy specifically
prescribes a course of action to be
followed by federal employees. Where
a federal mandate has removed the
elements of judgment or choice from
government action, claimants may file
suit under the FTCA.
The Eighth Circuit found no stat-
ute, regulation, or policy specifically
mandating the VA to inspect for as-
bestos. The court examined the regu-
lations which authorize the VA to con-
tract with private brokers to manage
and market property for sale. The
court found that these regulations do
not require the VA to supervise or
inspect for asbestos.
Even if the government conduct
involves an element of judgment, the
exception from tort claims will pro-
tect only those government actions
and decisions based on considerations
of public policy. The Supreme Court
has guided courts in discerning
whether a challenged government ac-
tion is grounded in public policy.
Berkovitz by Berkovitz v. United
States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988) and United
States v. Gaubert, 449 U.S. 315 (1991).
Following the Supreme Court, the
Eighth Circuit maintained that to de-
termine whether an action is grounded
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in public policy, the focus is not on the
government agency's subjective in-
tent in exercising the discretion con-
ferred by statute or regulation. Rather,
the focus is on the nature of the ac-
tions taken and on whether these ac-
tions are susceptible to policy analy-
sis.
The Eighth Circuit declared that a
government agency's day-to-day de-
cisions made in furtherance of policy
will be protected under the exception
from tort claims, especially when the
decisions relate to the extent to which
the agency must supervise the safety
procedures of private individuals.
Such supervision is neither feasible
nor practical in light of an agency's
staffing or funding. The Eighth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's con-
clusions on the FTCA tort claim ex-
ception.
The district court concluded that
the VA' s policy under its housing loan
program was to sell acquired property
quickly and at the best attainable price.
To further this policy, the VA hired a
management broker who would clean
the grounds and building and mini-
mize the risk of loss from theft, van-
dalism, and the elements. The district
court found the VA's actions as a
seller of property to be discretionary
and not subject to statutory or regula-
tory requirements mandating it or its
assignees to inspect for asbestos.
Thus, the district court determined
that the VA fell within the FTCA tort
claim exception. The Eighth Circuit
agreed with the district court's deci-
sion.
CERCLA Does Note Apply to a
"Consumer Product in Consumer
Use"
The Eighth Circuit next considered
the Kanes' CERCLA claim. The dis-
trict court stated that, under CERCLA:
(1) those persons who owned or oper-
ated facilities when the hazardous sub-
stance disposal occurred, and (2) own-
ers of the hazardous substances who
arranged for disposal or treatment of
those substances at a facility are liable
for costs incurred in response to the
release of hazardous substances. 42
U.S.C. Sections 9607(2) and 9607(3).
Both CERCLA sections require the
release or the disposal of a hazardous
substance at a "facility."
The Eighth Circuit interpreted the
meaning of "facility" under CERCLA.
The definition of 42 U.S.C. Section
9607 (a)(9) includes any building,
structure, installation, equipment, or
any site where a hazardous substance
has been deposited, stored, disposed
of, or placed or otherwise come to be
located. The definition, however, does
not include any "consumer product in
consumer use."
The Eighth Circuit noted that while
other courts have held that a "facility"
could include building materials into
which the asbestos was disposed, as
well as asbestos-filled buildings, Con-
gress intended to provide recovery
under CERCLA only for releases or
threatened releases from inactive and
abandoned waste sites, not releases
from useful consumer products con-
tained in the structure of buildings.
Applying this reasoning, the Eighth
Circuit held that the asbestos in the
Kanes' residence was a consumer
product in consumer use and there-
fore exempt under CERCLA.
Thus, the Eighth Circuit, in affirm-
ing the district court's dismissal of
claims based on the FTCA and
CERCLA, held that the VA was not
liable for damages resulting from the
presence of asbestos in property ac-
quired and sold under the administra-
tion of its housing loan program. -*o
Rosaire M. Hall
City of Lansing May Not
Allow Cable Television
Franchisee Mandatory
Access to Private
Property
In City of Lansing v. Edward Rose
Realty, Inc., 502 N.W.2d 638 (Mich.
1993), the Supreme Court of Michi-
gan invalidated a Lansing city ordi-
nance allowing mandatory access to
private property by a cable provider
that had been granted a city franchise.
The court held that the claimed public
purpose of the ordinance was subject
to heightened scrutiny because the
ordinance benefitted a private inter-
est, and this private interest predomi-
nated over the public interest. After
applying heightened scrutiny, the court
concluded that the ordinance was un-
reasonable. The Michigan Supreme
Court also determined that the man-
datory access granted by the ordi-
nance exceeded Lansing's authority
to exercise its power of eminent do-
main. Although the state law autho-
rized Lansing to condemn private
property for any public use within the
scope of its powers, no state statute
identified mandatory access to pri-
vate property by a city-franchised
cable operator as a public use or pur-
pose. The court found the "public
purposes" that Lansing asserted were
insufficient to overcome a property
owner's right to exclude others from
her property.
Ordinance 753
In 1974, the city of Lansing en-
tered into a franchise agreement with
Continental Cablevision. The agree-
ment gave Continental the
nonexclusive right to operate its cable
system in Lansing. Continental agreed
to provide nine designated access
channels, universal service, and an
emergency override system. It also
agreed to pay 3 percent of its gross
franchise revenues to Lansing.
92 Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
Recent Cases I
